We critically evaluate existing evidence, discuss possible mechanisms of action-specific effects, and make recommendations for future research. In this article, we present a synthetic review of this debate, drawing from the literatures of both approaches, to clarify both the surprising similarities and the core differences between them.

We argue here that polarized debate can impede scientific progress and that the search for similarities between 2 sides of a debate can sharpen the theoretical focus of both sides and illuminate important avenues for future research. Heretofore, the debate has been quite polarized, with efforts largely being focused on supporting one view and dismantling the other.

The opposing view holds that action capability has little or no influence on perception. Though influential, this account has not been universally accepted, and in fact a heated controversy has emerged. In this view, for example, decreased ability to climb a hill because of fatigue makes the hill visually appear to be steeper. The action-specific perception account holds that people perceive the environment in terms of their ability to act in it. Our native language is thus one of the forces that determine what we consciously perceive. We conclude that linguistic enhancement of color contrasts provides targets with a head start in accessing visual consciousness. The behavioral consequence of categorical perception was replicated with Russian speakers (N=46), confirming reproducibility of this novel finding. German speakers (N=29), placing the “Greek” blues into one category, showed no differences between blue and green targets. Electrophysiological signatures of early visual processing predicted this behavioral advantage. Native Greek speakers (N=28), who distinguish categorically between light and dark shades of blue, showed boosted perception for this contrast compared to a verbally unmarked green contrast. We employed EEG and the attentional blink paradigm in which targets are often unnoticed. Finally, we will describe the effect of dopaminergic deregulation observed in some pathologies and its impact on recognition memory.Ĭan our native language influence what we consciously perceive? While evidence accumulates that language modulates visual discrimination, little is known about the relation between language structure and consciousness. We will discuss the relationship between dopaminergic activity and perceptual salience of stimuli enabling learning and consolidation processes necessary for the novel-familiar transition. This review will discuss the evidence that indicates changes in dopaminergic activity during exposure to novel objects or places, promoting the consolidation and persistence of memory. The catecholaminergic system has been of vital interest due to its role in several aspects of recognition memory.

The novel object recognition (NOR) and object location recognition (OLRM) memory paradigms represent experimental models of recognition memory that allow us to study the neurobiological mechanisms involved in episodic memory. The sense of familiarity is essential for successful recognition memory in general, familiarization allows the transition of labeling a stimulus from the novel (salient) to the familiar (non-salient). Here, we propose “perceptual salience” to define how memory mediates the integration of inconspicuous stimuli into a relevant memory trace without apparently altering the recognition of the physical attributes or valence, enabling the detection of stimuli changes in future encounters. However, previously learned experiences also facilitate the perception and processing of information to establish their salience. Usually, the properties of the stimuli, such as intensity, duration, frequency, and novelty, among others, determine the salience of the stimulus. To survive, animals must recognize relevant stimuli and distinguish them from inconspicuous information.

Top down processing example